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PROBLEMS POSED BY PUBLICITY TO
CRIME AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS *
GERHARD 0. W. MUELER t
The impact of publicity upon criminal activities and criminal law
enforcement has been the subject of a vast literature during the last
few decades. Much of this literature is inspiring, patriotic, and in-
telligent. More of it is trite, nearsighted, and useless. Nearly every
writer approaches this topic with a preconceived notion of a clash of
two fundamental principles: the free press and the fair trial. This,
unfortunately, is too narrow a frame within which to treat the wide
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been published in French, under the Title Problemes Soulevis Par Ia Publiciti Donnie
Aux Poursuites Criminelles (with memorandum of law) by the Association Inter-
nationale de Droit Penal, Paris, France (1961), and under the title Les Problemes
Posis Par Ia Publiciti Donie Aux Procedure Penale (without memorandum of law),
by the Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale, Milan, Italy (1961).
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come true.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Comparative Criminal Law Project, New
York University. Abitur 1947, Ploen College, Germany; J.D. 1953, University of
Chicago; LL.M. 1955, Columbia University. President, American National Section
of the Association Internationale de Droit Penal.
2 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
range of problems encompassed by this topic. If, indeed, there is any
clash of principles, it is between the right of the citizen-the employer
of all government-to intelligent and complete information on all
goings-on everywhere,' and his equally great right to be free from detri-
ment through crime. The right to know is limited by the ability of
the individual to gather and absorb information and by the right of
other individuals to keep their affairs from public view. Both the
right to know and the right of privacy are recognized and protected
in orderly societies. This holds true in the United States.
In the context of this Article, it is not necessary to define the
area of the knowable which is subject to some privilege against pub-
licity, since, by long usage, crime-in common with other calamities-
and criminal procedure are largely within the range of the unprivileged
knowable. Obviously, it cannot be ascertained that a certain calamity
is a crime and that those involved are criminal perpetrators and victims
until a court has spoken. Thus, not only criminal elements, but non-
criminals as well, if cruelly treated by nature, cannot help becoming
the subject of public knowledge. Normally, considerations of pity and
decency, rather than law, must be relied on to protect them from a
conceivably merciless public scrutiny. For, apart from the social good
which an unfettered right to know and to make known produces,' it
is not at all the government's business to ascertain whether any given
publicity will produce any specific social good. On principle, govern-
ment simply has no authority to interfere with the right to know,
whether the effect be good, bad, or indifferent. But there is an obvious
natural limitation of the rights to disseminate and to receive knowl-
edge: when there is a "clear and present danger" ' that the protected
interests of our society-including the very right to know-will be
destroyed, we have reached the limits of permissible publicity.
We must, then, consider the second of the two basic rights men-
tioned at the outset: the citizens' right to be free from criminal
depredations. This right can be likened to the right to be protected
against the enemy without, which requires a considerable amount of
secrecy about the nation's defense measures and military plans and
intentions. The same holds true for protection against the enemy
within; if disclosure of police information will aid the criminal, or if
'The right to know must not be thought to imply a positive governmental duty
to provide information; it is merely a right (in the Hohfeldian sense) to be free
from interference therewith, and, as such, implies a governmental "no-right' to inter-
fere with the acquisition of information.
2 The greater the de facto participation of the citizenry in government, the greater
must be the citizens' right and actual opportunity to know, for government requires
the informed judgments of those of whom it is composed.
$Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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publicity given to crime and criminal proceedings will increase the
danger of loss to the citizenry through crime, secrecy must be im-
posed. This secrecy is a matter of self-discipline of a mature society,
a self-imposed restraint upon the right to know. The danger potential
can never be determined exactly, and one difference between demo-
cratic societies and those of opposite persuasion is that democratic
societies tend to strike the balance in favor of the right to know, while
nondemocratic societies fearfully restrict that right.4
So much on the matter of principle. Now to the details.
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASES OF THE RIGHT To KNOW
Contrary to the system prevailing in several other nations, in the
United States, the government itself participates little in gathering and
disseminating information to the general public, but, as with so many
activities elsewhere carried on by government, leaves this function
largely to private enterprise and initiative.
There has been a long development from the travelling minstrel
and the town crier to the roving radio reporter with his walkie-talkie
and the roving television reporter with his creepy-peepy. Just as the
law of libel could not exist until after Gutenberg's invention of the
press, so the legal conflict over the right to know about crime and
criminal proceedings could not become acute until after technological
development had made for an enormous distribution of all mass com-
munications media, and for a wide dispersion of the facilities of dis-
semination. The problem of the impact of publicity on crime and
criminal proceedings cannot possibly be acute where either the receipt
of information is limited to a few or the distribution lies in but one
paternalistic hand. What marks the American scene is the widest
conceivable distribution of both dissemination and receipt. It is par-
ticularly noteworthy that dissemination is frequently carried on by
opposing interests, such as labor and management or liberals and
conservatives. Thus, whatever bias may be interwoven with the
information disseminated is likely to be offset by the opposing bias
of another source, and governmental bias is limited and constantly
scrutinized by all the mass communications media. It is this which we
call the freedom of the press.5
4 The factual basis of this argument may be seen by comparing the amount and
extent of military and police information printed in the American and in the Soviet
press.
5 "While it is true that certain differences do exist between the [mass communi-
cations] media, the important basic similarities must be stressed. All of the media
may be viewed as economic structures, each possessing its owners, producers, trans-
mitters, and consumers. More important, the same basic principles of communication
apply to all of them, again, with some differences expected." Orlow & Francis, Mass
Comnntication and Crime, in SOCIOLO6Y OF CRmmE 239 (Roucek ed. 1961).
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Freedom of the press is subject to nonlegal and legal restraints,
and that is no paradox, for a freedom without restraint is a contradic-
tion in terms-it would be anarchy.
The nonlegal restrictions are bureaucratic self-restraint of govern-
ments and personal restraint and secrecy. There are also economic
restraints, foremost among which are sponsors' and advertisers' in-
clinations,7 and the economic pressure of interest groups, which are
necessarily composed largely of consumers.'
The legal restraints are to be found in the laws of obscenity,'
libel,' 0 contempt," treason, and espionage, and, in an incidental way,
in other rules of tort and criminal law 2 as well as in some local morals
censorship.'1
The right freely to disseminate information has been called the
most preferred right of the federal constitution, binding both federal
and state governments.14 This should not amaze anyone, for the
freedom to disseminate information was one of the paramount issues
of the American Revolution. 5 I know of no other nation in which
there is so little restraint on the freedom of publicity, and such a luscious
use of this freedom.
This Article will concentrate on the impact of publicity upon two
vital aspects of criminal law: the administration of criminal justice, in
both its judicial and investigative phases, and the phenomenon of crime
itself.
6 See generally THAYR, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS (3d ed. 1956).
7 Conservative advertisers, for example, do not advertise in scandalous publica-
tions, and advertisers and sponsors as a whole often prefer to restrict a publication's
emphasis on crime and criminal proceedings.
8 See, e.g., Note, Extralegal Censorship of Literature, 33 N.Y.U.L. R v. 989
(1958).
9 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; KRONnAUSEN & KRON-
HAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW (1959) (which citation does not indicate any
endorsement of the authors' work); ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW
(1956).
I0 See generally HIcKSON & CARTER-RUcE, LIBEL AND SLANDER (1953) ; PEmxNs,
C imiNAL LAW 351-65 (1957); YANKWicH, IT's LIBEL OR CONTEMPT IF YOU PIUNT
IT (1950).
"1 See generally PERxINs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 456-69 (1957) ; YANXKWICH,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 469-528; Donnelly & Goldfarb, Contempt by Publication in
the United States, 24 MOD. L. Rxv. 239 (1961) ; Goldfarb, The History of the Con-
tempt Power, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
12But the extent of criminal law restraints on publications is extremely limited.
That this is a mixed blessing was emphasized by the television quiz scandals and
other wrongs committed directly by members of the mass communications industry.
See generally Orlow & Francis, supra note 5, at 243-44.
13 Local motion picture morals censorship recently survived a broad attack on
its constitutionality-to the shock of all civil libertarians-in Times Film Corp. v.
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
14 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) ; see also Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959), 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1086, 1090 (1960).
15 On the history, see Lewis, The Right to Complain: The Trial of John Peter
Zenger, 46 A.B.A.J. 27 (1960).
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II. PUBLICITY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A. Purpose
Earlier I have pointed out that the confinement of this topic to
the issue of free press v. fair trial is too narrow. Now I shall hasten
to add that the seeming opposition even lacks an historical basis in
fact.
It should be remembered that the principal purpose of the oral,
open, and immediate criminal procedure which is traditional with
American courts and which was introduced in Europe during the
revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries is to guarantee truth (and
thus justice), something which a secret procedure is not as capable of
attaining. In other words, publicity and the fair trial are not opposites,
but correlatives, the purpose of trial publicity being to insure truth,
justice, and fairness."8 But the traditional American public trial has
a character all its own, and that shall be explained shortly.
B. Law and Constitution
The public trial is an old American and common-law tradition.
The Charter of Fundamental Laws of 1676 of the colony of West
Jersey guaranteed a trial in "publick" court,'7 as did the "Laws agreed
upon in England" in 1682 for Sir William Penn's Dominion,'" and an
"open court" was guaranteed by the North Carolina Declaration of
Rights. 9 The laws of all other colonies were to the same effect, as
are the laws of the various states now. °
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution begins
with the words: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial," making it the right of the de-
fendant in any federal criminal proceeding to benefit from the scrutiny
and protection which a public trial may entail. Obviously, prelim-
16BENTHAM, JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 68 (Dumont ed. 1825); 3 BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *373; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 332-35 (3d ed. 1949) (discussing
cases) ; see People v. Jelk; 284 App. Div. 211, 230, 130 N.Y.S.2d 662, 680 (1954).
17 Ch. 23, in HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 17 n.26 (1951).
18 Ch. V, in HELLER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 18 n.29.
19 Arts. VII and IX, in HELLER, op. cit. supra note 17, at 22 n.57.
20 See FELLMAw, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS 55 (1958). In addition, the guar-
antees of the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution are to a certain extent
obligatory upon the states through the fourteenth amendment. It re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948). And they may be protected not only by direct review of state court
convictions but also in federal courts by means of the writ of habeas corpus. As
recently as the closing weeks of the 1960-61 term, the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction where a change of venue in a state court had been insufficient to counteract
prejudice resulting from widespread publicity of the crime. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717 (1961).
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inary investigation of crime is not public;"1 the right to publicity
begins with arraignment.2 This pretrial secrecy is an example of the
exercise of communal self-restraint of the right to know, of which I
spoke earlier.
C. Sociological Explanation-Trial Publicity and the Mass Media
1. Direct Publicity
In early frontier America, when no motion pictures, no television,
and no radio provided entertainment, trial day in the county was like
fair day, and from near and far citizens young and old converged on
the county seat. The criminal trial was the theater and spectaculum
of old rural America. Applause and cat calls were not infrequent. All
too easily lawyers and judges became part-time actors at the bar, and
American lawyers still have some of that demeanor typical of stage
folk, and they are still very active participants in the trial process.
But it would be false to assume that American lawyers still act--or,
for that matter, ever did act-for the sole pleasure of the audience.
Nor is, or ever was, the American criminal trial a theater play. The
right of the public to spur the participants by applause and to acclaim
the proceedings has long ceased. Today when manifestations of ap-
proval of a witness' testimony are made by spectators, the court may
feel impelled to grant a new trial, and such has been the rule for a
long time.' A guilty verdict has been reversed when it appeared that
the trial judge permitted spectators to make constant and open hostile
demonstrations toward the accused so as to jeopardize the fairness of
the trial.2
Even in frontier days it would have been wrong and rather
superficial to regard the audience in the courtroom as nothing but a
crowd of entertainment-seekers. It was felt to be the business of
everyone in the county to be present when in their name justice was
dispensed. The accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much per-
haps as the execution of punishment, operated to restore the imbalance
which was created by the offense or public charge, to reaffirm the
temporarily lost feeling of security and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent
"urge to punish" which Professor Weihofen has so aptly described.25
2 1 But despite secrecy of investigative proceedings, incommunicado imprisonment
before trial is strictly forbidden and punishable. See generally Mueller, The Law
Relating to Police Interrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 2
(1961).
22 See ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL 87 (1947).
2 3 See, e.g., Hickox v. State, 95 Tex. Crim. 365, 253 S.W. 823 (1923); Pender-
grass v. State, 157 Ark. 173, 248 S.W. 914 (1923) (dictum).
24 See Commonwealth v. Hoover, 227 Pa. 116, 75 Atl. 1023 (1910).
2 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
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The public wanted to be directly and personally convinced that justice
was done. It still is the people's trial, although they no longer may
officially acclaim the judgment as did the Umstand of our Germanic
past 26 or the spectators of frontier days. Popular justice is public
justice-it is play with popular emotions while doing or restoring
right. A secret trial entails no such popular satisfaction. But it can-
not be emphasized strongly enough that Anglo-American criminal pro-
cedure has always shunned the purge or show trial whose principal
function is to give vent to popular indignation, to arouse political
emotions, and to rally partisan solidarity-a method so frequently re-
sorted to by revolutionary systems.2
The outcry of a woman spectator in a recent New Jersey rape
trial demonstrates the American attitude. This simple woman was
completely absorbed in the proceedings at the bar. The seventeen-
year-old victim related the shocking events with utmost reluctance.
The questioner dug deeper and deeper into her memory, trying to
destroy the unconscious defense of her psyche. "We can't go on like
this !" was the cry of the woman spectator.28 In this "we" is revealed
the feeling of active participation common to American trial spectators.
At the same time, this outburst raises the possible need for limit-
ing public access to the courtroom and the publicity which may be
given to criminal proceedings, in the interest both of the parties im-
mediately concerned and of the general public.
2. Indirect Publicity
In the America of a more leisurely age, the agents of publicity
produced little danger to the ordinary conduct of a trial. Rarely was
a trial of more than local interest. The citizenry was personally
assembled at the trial, at least in part, and the press reporter, equipped
with paper and pencil, was hardly noticeable.
In urbanized America the public can no longer participate as
before, although, especially in small county seats, the courtroom still
harbors that ever-present congregation of senior citizens, retired from
busy lives, who follow every trial and participate as silent sages of
popular justice. Long after the close of the trial, the discussion of the
proceedings will continue on the courthouse steps or on the benches on
courthouse square. In the big cities the curious are always present
2 6 See MUELLER, LAYMEN AS JUDGES AND JURORS IN GERmANY AND AUSTRIA
9-13 (1954).
27 This happened during the French Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, and under
the Soviet system, for the latest example of which see Berman, Introduction to THE
TRIAl. OF THE U2 (1960). While this was being written, the Eichmann trial was in
progress in Israel. It, too, had all the trappings of a show trial.
28 State v. Riley, 28 N.J. 188, 202, 145 A.2d 601, 609 (1958).
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in the courtroom, as are friends and relatives of victim and defendant,
and for every dramatic trial the courtroom is packed with sensation-
seekers. But the general public has, for practical reasons, no longer
the time nor the opportunity to attend the criminal court. It is for
this reason that press coverage of criminal trials has assumed a sig-
nificance which it did not have prior to the present century. At the
same time, due to an enormous distribution of mass media, the impact
of publicity is far out of proportion to its influence in the 19th century.
The press is present whenever any case is slightly more than
routine, and murder cases receive enormous publicity.29 We feel that
this is a substitute for the type of public participation at the trial itself
which was possible a century ago. There is even a movement under
way to admit newspaper photographers and television crews to the
courtroom. In most states, however, Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics 3 is strictly interpreted to preserve the dignity of
judicial proceedings and to prohibit a "show" from being made of the
trial, an occasional exception to the contrary notwithstanding."' In
all but a few courts picture taking is prohibited, and violation of the
rule may result in conviction for contempt of courtY" Recent experi-
ments have shown, however, that television and press photography
29 While I was writing this, the first Finch-Tregoff trial was in progress in Los
Angeles. Probably more than half of the daily papers in America devoted every
second headline to this affair. Mystery writer Eric Ambler, writing for the 6'/z
million readers of Life, reported as follows:
The Finch-Tregoff trial is in the rich, rococo tradition of great American
court room dramas. It has everything which that tradition demands. It
has love, lust, passion, hate, greed, adultery, plots, counterplots, sensational
disclosures. It has a cast of characters which includes beautiful blondes,
beautiful brunettes, Hollywood "personalities," hired "killers," private eyes
and Perry-Mason-like attorneys-and is now making the most of it. The
last murder trial this writer attended was held in London's Old Bailey, as
greasy and evocative as a hangman's rope. The Finch trial courtroom is a
pleasant contrast: spacious, air conditioned and well lit To the easy in-
formality of Western justice, however, there has now been added a carnival
atmosphere which even experienced newspapermen find disconcerting. One
local bugle is running a series of "impressions" written by a series of Holly-
wood actresses. The sight of these ladies, pad and pencil in hand and skirts
hitched up becomingly, being photographed while they interview the eagerly
cooperative Miss Tregoff, is troubling. Are a man and a woman really on
trial here for their lives? The actresses' observations fail to provide an
answer. Jayne Meadows found Dr. Finch "fascinating". Patricia Owens
announced after an interview that Carole Tregoff "was being very sensible
about the whole thing." That, at least, is good to know.
Life, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 24. If such is the behavior and attitude of the press, one must
doubt the sincerity of their motives.
30 Improper Publicizing of Court Proceedings. Proceedings in court should
be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of photographs
in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions,
and the broadcasting or televising of court proceedings are calculated to
detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness
in giving his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted. . .
31 E.g., Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1958).
3 2 See Note, 19 LA. L. RFv. 694, 696 & n.11 (1959).
[Vo1.110:1
1961] PUBLICITY TO CRIME AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 9
can be employed without the least disturbance of the proceedings and
even without the notice of those engaged in the trial."
Apart from giving the general public the satisfaction of vicarious
participation in the trial and of supplying the judicial information
which no longer can be gathered personally, such publicity given to
trials permits the widest scrutiny of the proceedings. Judicial or
administrative irregularities can be uncovered by the skilled reporter-
observer. A few examples may demonstrate the point. When years
ago it became apparent that in Chicago not all was well with the
criminal trial judiciary, the Chicago Crime Commission, a private citi-
zens' organization which seeks to improve criminal justice by publiciz-
ing abuses, stationed lawyer-detectives in every criminal courtroom and
publicized the findings of these observers. Irregularities quickly ceased.
Later a public complaint was heard that Chicago criminal judges fol-
lowed too much their own philosophies and idiosyncrasies in imposing
sentences, that some were too soft and others too tough, that some were
too lazy and others too eager, in short, that great inequalities abounded
in the Chicago criminal courts. Again the Crime Commission entered
the picture and compiled and publicized statistics, showing for every
judge how many hours he spent on the bench during a given period,
how many cases he tried, how many motions he heard, and how many
dismissals, acquittals, and convictions were rendered in his court, as
well as the length of the sentences he imposed. Again the situation
improved under the pressure of public opinion aroused through
publicity.
What is true of publicity given to the administration of justice
at the trial stage is also largely true for the stage of police proceedings.
The press keeps the police in check. The watchdog task of the press
proved of particular value in uncovering abuses which marked many
urban American police forces during the 1920's. The relative humane-
ness of American police today is in no small part due to the publicity
which the daily press gave to abuses. 4 And such public scrutiny con-
tinues unabated.
Now, obviously, it was never envisaged to be the function of the
press and other mass communications media to supervise the organiza-
tion and functioning of American police forces, and to the European
observer any such mere suggestion sounds absurd. But American
police forces still are, to a large extent, lay agencies, and even where
33 Comment, The New Star Chamber-TV in the Courtroom, 32 So. CAL. L. REv.
281 (1959). Even these studies cannot account for the possible effects which mere
knowledge that a trial is being broadcast-whether or not cameras or microphones
are visible-might have on the participants.
84 See HOPKINs, OuR LAwiEss POLIcE 34-44 (1931).
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they have been professionalized, they still retain some of the char-
acteristics of lay or popular police forces. They are, indeed, frequently
under popularly elected supervision. But this supervision is not all-
seeing or omnipresent. Here the watchful eye of publicity takes over.
The press maintains the nexus between the police and their employers,
the taxpaying public. And where the employers' elected agents fail,
the press frequently succeeds through the power of the pen or the
waves of the air. 5
D. Direct Limits of Trial and Pretrial Publicity
Nothing could be clearer than the mandate to limit the fairness-
insuring device of publicity when it tends to frustrate rather than
insure fairness of the proceedings to any one or all of the participants.
Restriction of publicity has been widely achieved in America with
respect to certain categories of proceedings, among them juvenile court
proceedings,36 criminal-sexual psychopath proceedings, and others of
similar nature. 7 There have been instances of partial restriction, often
limited to juvenile spectators but occasionally extending to the public
as such. Such restrictions often cause a storm of indignation. In
general, the public is excluded only when state secrets or morality-
endangering testimony is received into evidence.3 And even in the
espionage trial of the Rosenbergs the press was admitted throughout,
but pledged to secrecy as to all confidential matters; spectators were
entirely excluded during the reception into evidence of government
secrets. Indeed, a diligent researcher was unable to find a single case
on record, in either England or the United States, from 1641 to date,
in which a trial took place in complete secrecy.39 Pretrial publicity is
limited, to the extent possible, by the internal regulations of the enforce-
ment agencies and by the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.
E. Dangers to the Administration of Criminal Justice
1. Dangers to the Defendant
Our prime concern should be over the protection of the interests
of the defendant. And, indeed, the right to an open and public trial
35 For a newspaperman's conceptions, see Hoskins, The Press and the Adnnms-
tration of Justice, Fed. Prob, June 1958, p. 31.
S6 Even in this area there is a movement to restore publicity as a deterrent upon
parents who, it is surmised, may thus be induced to exercise greater supervision over
their children. Scientific evaluations of the conflicting theories are wanting.
37 6 WIGMORE, EviDENcE §§ 1835-36 (3d ed. 1949).
38 See, e.g., People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N.Y. Supp. 433 (1900) (extortion
for sodomy).
39 FELLMAN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 56.
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has been held to be solely his right.4" The defendant may insist on an
open trial, but, unfortunately, the reverse is not necessarily true; he
may not-in most jurisdictions-insist on a secret trial, however much
the open proceedings may harm him in the public eye. 1 Thus, when
prejudice to the defendant has to be feared from openness and publicity
of the criminal proceedings, we have relied chiefly on means other than
exclusion of the public and the press from trial. It is unfortunate that
the dangers inherent in a possible waiver policy have been held to be
greater than the possible benefits of waiver.
The worst possible form which trial and pretrial publicity may
take is the so-called "trial by newspaper." This is the highly emotional
and often fact-unrelated newspaper suggestion as to a defendant's guilt
or innocence, elaborately arrived at by questioning everybody con-
cerned and following clues (sometimes with a more costly apparatus
than that available to the public prosecution) and publicized in lengthy
illustrated articles, sold in millions of copies all over the country. Re-
cently even maps and graphs, showing the position of every participant
at the scene of the crime, are being included. Puttkammer and Barnes
and Teeters have given us vivid descriptions of American actualities,4"
which compare unfavorably with the relatively restrained British prac-
tice, though recent press behavior in Britain has given rise to increas-
ing complaints and calls for wider employment of criminal sanctions
to curb undesirable practices.43
Excessive publicity jeopardizes the fairness of the trial which is
guaranteed to every defendant under federal and state constitutional
provisions.44  There are limitations to the devices available to
ameliorate the possible ill effects of publicity. Censorship of published
reports is limited to obscenity, exclusion of the public is rarely per-
mitted, and the common-law power to punish for contempt is relatively
limited and in need of reform4 5 But, as evidenced by Canon 35, dis-
turbance-creating mass media may be and usually are excluded under
40 United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). Contra,
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955). See gen-
erally Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381 (1932).
41 See E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, supra note 40. See generally Note, 36 OR.
L. REv. 345 (1957).
42 PUTTKAMMER, ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 52-58 (1953); BARNES &
TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 192-98 (2d ed. 1951).
43 See Coutts, Press Behavior and the Criminal Law, 22 J. CRIM. L. 145 (1958).
4 4 For a factual account of the impact of publicity upon the Lindbergh kidnapping
case and similar trials, see Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal
Trials, 24 MINN. L. REv. 453 (1940). The effect of pretrial publicity on the reliability
of witnesses is discussed in Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 101, 103-04 (1951) ; see also Bird,
The Influence of the Press Upon the Accuracy of Report, 22 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL
PsYcH. 123, 129 (1927).
45 See generally Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause
Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 810, 824-31 (1961).
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the contempt power, principally in order to preserve courtroom
decorum. Due to these shortcomings, we have to rely mainly on a
number of ancient methods to guarantee a defendant his constitutional
right to a fair trial: "
Change of venue or of venire. Upon a showing of general prej-
udice in the county of trial, the defendant may have his case removed
to another county, or may have his case tried locally by a jury drawn
from a neighboring county.
Continuance. Upon a showing of grave current bias and danger
in the county, trial may be postponed until calm has been restored.
Voir dire. Upon the impanelling of the petit jury,. the defendant
may (1) challenge the entire panel as drawn in violation of the law,
(2) challenge individual jurors for specific causes, such as bias or
prejudice, whether created by publicity or otherwise, and (3) challenge
a certain number of jurors peremptorily, that is, without any assigned
cause. Similarly, he may object to judge and prosecutor on grounds
of personal bias, conflict of interests, and the like.
Isolation of the jury. The jury is isolated from any publicity
influence for the length of the trial, if not by physical segregation, then
by instructions not to discuss the case with anyone and not to receive
any public or private information about the case except what is pre-
sented in open court.
Instructions. At the close of the trial, the jury is warned to
decide only upon the facts introduced at the trial.
By these means, a trial is had before a relatively openminded
jury-which is sometimes hard to find when nationwide publicity has
preceded the trial-and this jury is isolated from the influence of
publicity during trial. But dangers to the fairness of the trial remain,
and interested criminologists concur in believing that the balance is
presently struck in favor of freedom of the press.
2. Dangers to Others
I deem it entirely proper that through the press the public is per-
mitted to participate at least vicariously in the administration of crim-
inal justice, much as it could do so more personally a century or
so ago. On the other hand, Canon 35 is entirely right in its stand
against making a mockery and circus out of criminal trials by the use
of cameras and other devices. The truth can be found best where calm
46 See generally id. at 818-22, where the efficacy of these devices is pointedly
questioned.
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prevails. When life and liberty are at stake, the right to entertainment
must take a second billing. There is a real danger in excessive re-
portage, especially picture reportage, of criminal trials: Judges and
lawyers may become publicity-hungry actors catering to the camera
rather than to justice, particularly if they will have to face reelection.
Newspaper and television should not dictate policy within a courtroom.
I fear that they are already dictating too much judicial policy from
without it.
Excessive publicity also constitutes a danger to the safety or
reputation of innocent witnesses. Presently, unless they are children,
little can be done to keep their identity confidential. Witnesses cannot
very well be hooded or kept entirely concealed, as happens occasionally
in congressional investigations, for in a criminal trial the defendant
is entitled to be confronted by his accusers and witnesses.
3. Direct Dangers to Law Enforcement
There is a grave danger inherent in excessive publicity during the
investigation stage. As soon as a crime has been committed, the papers
splash headlines across the front page and newscasters interview all
conceivable sources of information, thereby possibly impeding the
police in their attempt to solve the crime 7 Even strategic secrets of
police work, such as stakeouts, suspects, and missing clues, often are
revealed.
According to the prevailing view, protection of freedom of the
press is so necessary for the preservation of our democratic way of
life, that we must pay the price for this freedom-a price measurable
in losses through crime. It is sometimes suggested that as a rela-
tively wealthy nation, we can afford to pay this price. One might ask
why the police are so nearsighted as to reveal damaging information
to the press. The answer is to be found in the pressure and power
position of the press: The competitive spirit among newspapers for
the retention and enlargement of their reader market drives crime
reporters to ever greater competitive efforts in gathering information.
Their practices are not always ethical, though outright bribery is
probably rare. Their methods are much more subtle than that. The
police officer, prosecutor, or attorney who leaks information to a re-
porter will get a quid pro quo in the form of favorable publicity; he
who refuses to leak information will get unfavorable or no publicity,
47 Compare TRAIN, THE PRISONER AT THE BAR 334-35 (2d ed. 1908), describing
one of the author's cases in which the defendant had committed a murder shortly
following a highly publicized acquittal of a murder committed under very similar
circumstances. When asked why she had murdered, the second defendant replied: "Oh,
Nan Patterson did it and got off." See also TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 206 (rev. ed. 1950).
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and that may ruin his career.48 Efforts at restricting damaging press
releases have been singularly unsuccessful.
The unrestrained freedom to publicize what can be found out
about preliminary investigations has one further rather detrimental
consequence: Since some crime is highly newsworthy, publicity-seeking
officers will concentrate their efforts on such crimes to the detriment
of the investigation of other, less newsworthy, but equally or more
important, criminality.
There are other dangers in excessive trial and pretrial publicity,
but of a more indirect or impersonal nature, whether specific or general,
short range or long range, though these are even greater in the case
of publicity to the phenomenon of crime.
III. PUBLICITY TO THE PHENOMENON OF CRIME
A. Purpose
The phenomenon of crime is publicized either as a news event, in
which case the predominant purpose of the publicity is simply to
inform, or as an object of historical or fictional writing, in which
case the predominant purpose is to entertain. Neither form of
publicity can be said to be specifically desired by the government, as
is the case with trial publicity. Indeed, if we look beyond information
and entertainment, it is rather hard to identify any particular social
function which crime publicity may serve. But, as I said before, it is
not government's task to ask why, where freedom of publicity is
concerned.
Few, however, will doubt that crime is newsworthy and that it is
a legitimate object of vicarious entertainment-at least so history
teaches us. Such an explanation obviously cannot account for the
fact that there might be socially more desirable news events than
crime, such as milking or plowing championships, spelling bees, and
the patent registry. Why, one might ask, does crime rank so high,
when its understanding and treatment are matters of such high ex-
pertise, on a par, perhaps, with brain surgery? "Can it be lawful for
details and descriptions that ought to be reserved to the scientific,
police and law courts to be thrown to the lust of curiosity?" asked
Pope John XXIII.4
Nevertheless, the mass communications media attribute a social
purpose to their efforts. These claims will be investigated shortly.
4 8
TTAFT, op. cit. supra note 47, at 210.
49 N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1959, p. 22, col. 6.
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B. Law and Constitution
Just as the American press is free to report on criminal trials or
the activity or inactivity of the police, it is equally free to uncover and
publish information on the commission of crime. Of course, the press
has no greater rights to obtain entry to enclosures or to compel an-
swers to its questions than do ordinary citizens. Nor, in most
American jurisdictions, does the press enjoy any particular right, like
that given to priests, lawyers, and doctors, to keep its informants
secret.5" But their mere prestige puts the mass communications media
in a preferred position.
C. Sociological Explanation
No reasoning known to me can adequately explain the inordinate
amount of attention given to crime by American journalism. It is
true that we are a nation of rebels for whom the rough adventures of
outlaws are a greater entertainment than a royal ball at court. It is
true also that early experience of excitement requires greater excite-
ment at later stages to provide equal entertainment satisfaction. There
may even be cases in which the vicarious experience of crime amelio-
rates latent urges to experience crime directly. Certainly crime is easy
entertainment, and perhaps it is more pleasing after a hard day's work
than is the symphony, the opera, or a romantic novel. But even the
most common explanation offered by the purveyors of crime news and
entertainment-that their commercial polls show that this is what the
public wants-falls short of satisfying the curious inquirer. One
thing is certain: As long as peddling crime news and entertainment
remains profitable, our mass communications media will continue to
emphasize crime. For better or for worse, then, we are bound to live
with this phenomenon and must make the best of it by all lawful means
at our command.
Naturally, the mass communications media claim for themselves
a variety of noble justifications. Several are rather plausible, some
unquestionably are of incidental social significance. These are the
major claims:
Crime publicity serves as a direct deterrent. The underworld
hates publicity. This was discovered by Americans during the famed
investigations of organized crime and police practices under Wicker-
sham and Dewey in the late 1920's and 1930's and under Kefauver in
50 Bunks, Newspaperman's Privilege as to Sources, 13 N.Y.U. INTA. L. RFv.
170 (1958).
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the 1950's.51 In addition, publicity of crime alerts the citizenry
against the enemy within.
Crime publicity serves as an indirect deterrent. It is obviously
true that deterrence relies on the publicity given to successes in crime
detection and to impositions of punishment after convictions. Al-
though the principle does not seem open to refutation, the details are
very much in doubt. A recent study found that the phases of greatest
publicity given to murder cases are trial and conviction and sentenc-
ing;" ergo, following such great publicity, the murder rate should
drop for a limited time. Phases of lesser publicity, investigated in the
same study, included the commission of the offense, the beginning of
detection, and the execution of the offender. The author then investi-
gated all murder convictions in Philadelphia for a ten-year period,
comparing homicide rates for eight-week periods before and after the
respective publicity. He concluded that "there was no significant de-
crease or increase in the murder rate following the imposition of the
death penalty . . . . " This study must be accepted with great
care, and so the author himself warns, as the material at hand was
extremely limited. For the time being, however, it is interesting
at least to note that in one big American city for one ten-year period
the sensational newspaper publicity given to murder convictions seems
to have had neither a detrimental nor a beneficial influence on the
crime rate. Perhaps all we can say about Philadelphia murder pub-
licity (in lieu of more space allotted to political and cultural news) is
that it portrays a poor taste on the part of the newspaper-reading
public.
Why did the Philadelphia study fail to prove any deterrent effect?
In the first place, the quest was limited to short range effects. But
might not the publicity have a long range deterrent effect, one which
is not qualitatively or quantitatively measurable? It might be sug-
gested that indeed there is no deterrent effect because of the nature of
the reporting. As a matter of fact, all too frequently, despite an avowed
purpose to the contrary, the reporter adorns the criminal with at least
a glimmer of heroism. Might not such portrayals help to formulate
a wrong conception of criminals in the minds of the most impression-
able? All of these arguments add up to this: While the discussion of
the effects of publicity given to criminal activities may well rely on
51 Note that these experiences are not contradicted by occasional remarks, origi-
nating especially with forensic psychiatrists, that some crime stems from an urge to
gain publicity. See also voN HENTIG, CRIME CAUSES AND CONDITIONS 324-25 (1947).
52 Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 338 (1958).
5 3 Id. at 341.
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what is believed to be the accumulated experience of the ages, scien-
tific foundation is wanting in practically every respect.
Crime publicity serves to build a healthy conscience, to strengthen
community and individual superego by publicly tracing every crime to
its just reward. Suffice it to note that news coverage given to con-
viction and penal disposition of any given offender is infinitely smaller
and much more succinct than that given to a description of the crime
itself and the trial. Perhaps crime publicity could help build a healthy
conscience, but it is an exceptional periodical which treats crime in so
constructive a manner.
Crime publicity is an aid to the police. It is a fact that the
American mass communications media continue to demonstrate that
they can be quite helpful to the police in the solution of individual
cases. They may go along with the police in publishing misleading
information in order to trap a suspect; they may publish the description
of a suspect, leading to his arrest; they may create a favorable at-
mosphere in which the police can operate successfully. In short, they
do have the power to foster law enforcement and thus to contribute to
the general weal, and they do occasionally use this power properly,
but so far it has served only a minor function.
D. Direct Limits of Crime Publicity
Apart from the general restraints which govern all publications,
there are no direct restraints on crime publicity comparable to those
against excessive trial publicity. A direct restraint could only be in
the nature of censorship, and apart from the limited permissibility of
local morals censorship of motion pictures and import restrictions on
obscene publications,"5 both of which are quite peripheral to the main
areas of publicity concerning criminal activity, government has no
power to prohibit the dissemination of information about the commis-
sion of crime.
E. Dangers Inherent in Crime Publicity
1. Extent of Crime Publicity
Necessarily, whatever general dangers there are in the publicity
given to criminal proceedings also inhere in crime publicity. But
54 For a case which relied on public opinion polls to support a motion for a change
of venue, see Record, pp. 105-41, United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950).
See also Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: -The Pollsters Go to Court, 66
HRv. L. REv. 498 (1953).
55 As to the limits, see United States v. 31 Photographs, 156 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.
N.Y. 1957).
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beyond these there is a danger in unfettered crime publicity which is of
an even greater intensity than that of trial publicity.
A sensationalistic, profit-minded, mass communication medium
knows how to exploit the bestseller crime for its own business pur-
poses. An analysis of the daily press must indicate to even the most
staunch supporter of freedom of the press that there has been an in-
creasing tendency to devote considerably more coverage to crime in re-
lation to other facets of life than the relative significance of crime in the
total picture of local, national, and international events warrants. In
1930 it was reported for a typical American newspaper that 3.77 per
cent of content and headlines had been devoted to crime news.56 It is
my estimate that now, one generation later, comparable papers have sig-
nificantly increased their attention to crime. Indeed, one may justi-
fiably entertain the impression that "juvenile delinquency has become
a major factor in the American economy. Without it, many American
newspapers might have to go into receivership." 17 It has even been re-
ported that newspapers were instrumental in pressing for the repeal
of the New York Youth Court Act: "[N]ewspaper publishers were
against the bill because it would have thrown a veil of secrecy around
the criminal acts of youth." "
An appreciable segment of the American newspaper press feeds
principally on crime and caters specifically to morbid or melodramatic
interests. Of course, one cannot regard all mass communications
media, or even all publishers of the same media, as equally motivated.
Professor Taft grouped American newspapers in four categories: (1)
Conservative papers that generally refrain from publicity to crime, but
publicize such developments as crime prevention programs (Taft's
example: The Christian Science Monitor); (2) other conservative
papers that restrict crime news to "brief, unsensational accounts of
crime" (my examples: The New York Times, The New York
Herald Tribune); (3) a vast bulk of papers that "print much crime
news attempting not to offend average standards of good taste" (my
example: The New York World Telegram and Sun); (4) "not a few
[that] play up crime news because they believe their readers wish
sensational thrills" (my examples: papers ranging anywhere from
The National Enquirer to The New York Daily News)."
These categories do not include the pulp and slick magazines and
comic books which do not report crime at all, but, rather, fabricate
56 Caldwell, Sensational News in the Modern Metropolitan Newspapers, 23 J.
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & C. 190 (1932).
57 Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 83, 113 (1959).
58 N.Y. World Telegram & Sun, March 29, 1961, p. 12, col. 2.
5 9 TAFT, op. cit. supra note 47, at 205-06, citing CRAWFORD, THE ETHicS OF
JOURNALISM 114-15 (1924).
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crime as well as lust and violence exceeding the imagination of the
worst criminal minds, for the purpose of selling "entertainment"-
even and especially to children. While one might question the extent
of damage done by such publications, few will deny that they have
some influence on the creation of crime, especially juvenile crime; for
the impact of written argument on attitudes has been impressively
demonstrated. 60
When sensational crime news and such alternative sales items as
war, earthquake, or marital scandal are lacking, newspapers are known
to have "created" imaginary crime waves, thus conveying the impres-
sion that crime is rampant when actually all is well and normal. This
can be done rather easily by overemphasizing a few insignificant oc-
currences and by playing upon emotions.
Overintensive and distorted crime publicity can exert a detri-
mental influence in two dimensions, one short range and the other
long range.
2. The Short Range Effect
It has long been suggested that publicity given to modes of perpe-
trating crime, especially to the successful examples, invites or at least
enables the reader to imitate this criminality. 61 Even the casual ob-
server can affirm the validity of the argument. It is not unusual for
criminally disposed individuals to receive their clues for the modus
operandi of criminal ventures from prominent newspaper accounts of
successful exploits of other offenders. When an old lady in New York
City robbed a bank by threatening to throw a vial full of acid (it really
was water) into the teller's face, the newspapers literally burst with
admiration for the lady's ingenuity. Other persons promptly attempted
to repeat the performance, but with less success. Life recently reported
about the perpetrators of the Peugeot kidnapping--! l'Americaine-
that:
Rolland and Larcher had got it all-lock, stock and getaway
car-out of an American crime novel called The Snatchers.
The book, translated into French as Rapt (Abduction), told
how a U.S. gang kidnapped a financier's daughter. Larcher,
who read the book, had been swindled by a partner and now
saw a way to set himself up in business again. Rolland
wanted money for the high life which his poor boyhood in
Britain and a life of petty crime had denied him.
60 See Knower, Experimental Studies of Changes in Attitude, I1-A Study of
the Effect of Printed Argument on Changes in Attitude, 30 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL
PsycH. 522 (1936). See also Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials,
63 HARv. L. REv. 840 (1950).
61 See note 47 suPra.
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The Snatchers provided an extra blue print. It said steal
a car so no one could trace the registration. So the two stole
one. It said to get rid of the car afterward. They burned
it. The book printed an intricate ransom note. Larcher and
Rolland copied it almost word for word and sent it to
Peugeot. Maybe they did not read the book's ending: the
kidnappers die a l'Americaine under a hail of bulletsY
Such instances are episodic; there is no indication that any ap-
preciable portion of crime is attributable to imitation of exploits de-
scribed in print.63 The occasional occurrence of imitations constitutes
no reason to delimit the freedom of the press to report and publish on
crime, short of actually soliciting it.
Occasionally it is even contended that crime news encourages the
continued depredations of the offender whose crimes are publicized.
Indeed, it sometimes happens that the police find bundles of newspaper
clippings on the person of an arrestee, who treasures these much as an
actor treasures his scrap book of critics' appraisals. Among juvenile
gangs, the prestige of a member often is assessed in terms of the
newspaper coverage which his delinquent acts have received.' But
again, there is no reason to believe that all psychological types of
offenders share in this vanity. Neither is there evidence or cause to
believe that any appreciable portion of crime is attributable to this type
of publicity-induced vanity.
Indeed, all short-term effects of crime publicity, so frequently
asserted, are rarely demonstrated and, while plausible, are extremely
hard to measure, qualitatively or in any other way. 5
3. Long Range Effects
If publishers were to argue that their "crime-does-not-pay pub-
licity" has long range morale-building effects which are not empirically
ascertainable, they cannot refute the argument that excessive publicity
in which the emphasis lies on crime, rather than on "does not pay," has
an equally nonmeasurable detrimental effect. But I shall here
cautiously speak only of a mere danger. This is the danger that
62 Life, May 17, 1961, pp. 49-51.
3 Brasol's studies confirmed that crime news rarely has a cataclysmic effect,
though he attributed a definite, long range, morale-dulling effect to strong crime
publicity. BRASOL, THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME 165-85 (1927).
64 TArr, op. cit. supra note 47, at 207.
65 See generally KINGSBURY, HART & ASSOCIATES, NEWSPAPERS AND THE NEws
(1937). The same holds true for long range effects. On the whole problem, and on
experiments to measure long and short range effects, see BLUMER & HAUSER, MOVIES,
DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1933); Orlow & Francis, Mass Communication and
Crime, in SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME 239, 246-51 (Roucek ed. 1961) ; cf. HOVLAND, Lums-
DAINE & SHEFFIELD, STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN WORLD WAR II (1949).
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through the constant impact of all modern mass media which, for
business reasons, are tempted to cater more to stimulating cheap emo-
tions than to upholding the standards of right and wrong, our sense
of injustice may be slowly perverted.
Such warnings come not only from motion picture censors,"" but
from the clergy, 7 from distinguished psychiatrists,"8 and even from
newspaper men themselves.69 The argument is hard to refute, for the
very prestige of psychiatry rests on the theory of the molding of the
superego. How else but through frequent intrusions of outside forces
can superegos be developed? "
Naturally it would be absurd to attribute the oft-mentioned de-
cline of moral ideals in America-a phenomenon yet to be scientifically
demonstrated-or even the rising crime rate to the sole force of crime
publicity. 7 ' But a nexus strongly suggests itself. Moreover, the effect
may be not merely a blunting of the communal conscience, but an out-
right perversion. For example, it is conceivable that a certain type of
publicity may cause the public to adopt attitudes to criminals which are
inimical to crime prevention. Vindictiveness, long the tenor of much
of the popular press, could develop to such an extent that our society
would actually regress to a period which we hopefully had long passed.
All these dangers could be counteracted by intelligent editorials,
rather than editorialized reporting. But relatively few newspaper
readers turn to the editorial page when other pages are more exciting.
Furthermore, editorials cannot possibly contain that kind of intelligent
information about criminal law which can come only from the highly
66 See N.Y. World Telegram & Sun, July 22, 1960, p. 9, cols. 4-5: "'The real
danger is not obscenity but the continuous and unremitting stream of violence....
The stream of violence can have a very serious effect. It can have political conse-
quences. We will come to accept brutality. It will do away with the dignity of man.
These films counteract the moral value of education."' (statement by Hugh M. Flick,
Associate State Education Commissioner of New York).
67 Pope John XXIII stated: "It is not permissible to let the press undermine
the religious and moral foundations of the Life of the People." N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,
1959, p. 1, col. 5; p. 22, cols. 3-6. A commission of the National Council of Churches
reported: "[T]he potential of these media for good is balanced by a disturbing poten-
tial for the degradation of man, his manipulation, and his education in false systems
of value." More particularly, the commission said:
We speak here not merely of the pathological preoccupation with sex and
violence or of revelations of dishonest practices within the industries, but
more fundamentally of the assumption in both the content of the media and
the policies which govern them that man's end is material advantage, power
and pleasure, to be achieved through competing with, manipulating and ex-
ploiting his fellow man.
N.Y. Times, June 2, 1960, p. 23, col. 1.
68 See note 63 supra; WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT (1953).
69 See Crosby, We Teach Juvenile Delinquency, N.Y. Herald Trib., Feb. 20, 1961,
p. 19, col. 6; Deland, Battling Crime Comics to Protect Youth, Fed. Prob., Sept.
1955, p. 26.
70 BRASOL, op. cit. supra note 63, at 165-85; WERTHAM, op. cit. supra note 68.
71 See Clinard, Secondary Community Influences and Juvenile Delinquency, 261
Annals 42 (1949).
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trained criminal scientist. So far, only a few American papers have
made a practice of restricting crime news to accurate reporting supple-
mented by intelligent editorials."2 Inasmuch as the administration of
criminal justice is a popular matter and rightly commands public
interest, it should be made known that popular indignation, especially
if improperly aroused, cannot be successful either in meting out justice
or in repressing crime in general. Only professional leadership can
do that and such leadership, unfortunately, cannot be found in the
daily press. A pessimistic long range forecaster might predict that in
a matter of decades it will be impossible to muster the popular strength
to pass and uphold criminologically sound penal legislation, because of
the great impact of the intense and disturbing publicity which is being
thrust upon the human psyche with ever-increasing force.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this Article I hope to have demonstrated the issues at stake and
the American efforts to reduce the ferocity of the conflict between the
right to know, so important for intelligent popular government, which
cannot exist without relatively unfettered mass communications media,
and the right to be free from criminal depredations, which demands a
certain amount of secrecy of strategy against crime, an atmosphere of
calm judicial determination undisturbed by the noisomeness of exces-
sive publicity, and possibly even restraint in providing the public with
information about crime. We have not succeeded in reconciling the
conflict, but merely in alleviating it. If any imbalance there is, it is
presently in favor of the public's right to know.
The discussion of this provocative policy clash continues with
unabated heat in our country. The press is as adamant as it was in
John Peter Zenger's days in maintaining that the right to seek and
report news is without restriction-and it has the press in which to
make this point to the public. Those of opposite persuasion-many
trial lawyers, for example-have no such machinery with which to in-
fluence the public. To add to the confusion, there is a noisy minority
of trial attorneys who do prefer a completely unfettered press. (Is
their real reason the likelihood of reversal of a client's case for reasons
of prejudicial publicity? 73 Or is it the frustrated stage actor who takes
72 For the views of one of the editors of the Christian Science Monitor, see
Deland, Crime News Encourages Delinquency and Crime, 32 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 10
(1948).
73 See AMfERICAN BAR Ass'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 20. See
also People v. Fournier, 77 P.R.R. 208, 277-84 (1954); Brownell, Freedom and
Responsibility of the Press in a Free Country, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 178, 182 (1955) ;
Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. Rzv. 453
(1940); White, Newspaper and Radio Coverage of Criminal Trials, 41 J. CRIM. L. &
CRim. 306 (1950).
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this position?) Similarly, an appreciable number of prosecutors ap-
pear to favor unfettered publicity. Their reason may well be that the
prosecutor stands the better chance of receiving favorable publicity
than does the defendant or his attorney, and that prosecutors, who are
politically appointed or elected, need such publicity for their careers.
A change in attitudes among opponents and proponents can be
expected only when scientifically sound evidence is adduced as to the
effects which either policy produces.
The areas most in need of attention are these:
(A) Since, so we feel, the scales are presently weighted in favor
of publicity, and our means of protecting fairness do not prevent many
adverse effects of publicity, the right-duty to an open trial should be
converted into a clear right, which a defendant may intelligently waive
for reasons of possible prejudice. The ability to waive an open trial
should include the right to waive trial by a jury and to consent to
trial by a judge.74
(B) On the question of pretrial publicity and its possible harm
to a defendant, no change of present policy can be advocated until
scientific studies have been made.
(C) Since, at the moment, despite an overabundance of scholarly
attention, scientific information on the areas here discussed is wanting,
I would advocate inquiries on the following topics:
(1) The modus operandi of newspaper crime reporters in
the gathering of crime news;
(2) police department measures to curb unauthorized re-
lease of investigation news;
(3) the actual prejudice which a defendant suffers from
sensational publicity;
(4) the effect which news about crime, trials, convictions,
executions, and releases, has on the general crime rate;
(5) the real effect of newspaper accounts, television demon-
strations, and the like, upon offenders who claim or are believed
to have been inspired by them.
74 These proposals are supported by Goldfarb, supra note 45, at 831-32, 834-35.
Goldfarb also suggests that it should be made possible for a judge to take a criminal
case from the jury when, in his judgment, "notoriety, public pressure, or press com-
ment causes a situation in which the jury would not be able to decide the case im-
partially," id. at 832; that the federal practice of using three-judge trial courts should
be adopted in sensational criminal trials, id. at 833; and that the ethical canons dealing
with conduct of trial counsel should be more stringently enforced in notorious criminal
cases, ibid. Goldfarb's excellent paper was published too late for consideration in
the report on which this Article was based. However, I wish to note my agreement
with most of the views expressed by Mr. Goldfarb.
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If demands for a curb on publicity in the interests of trial fairness
and public safety find support in these inquiries, then possible legislation
should be studied which will reconcile these demands with the consti-
tutional guarantee of a fair trial. Informal restraints designed to
minimize publicity which possesses a material potential for long or
short range danger should also be explored in the light of the results
of the proposed studies.
As for the long and short range effects of our practice of wide-
spread crime publicity on the nation as a whole or on groups or indi-
viduals, it seems that all interested observers are convinced of the
existence of such effects, and that the vast majority of them attribute
a negative, rather than a positive, effect to crime publicity. As two
scientific observers put it:
[T]he shortage of . . . studies is seen to be acute. For the
most part, the existing studies are inconclusive either by their
own admission or through questionable research methods.
If we are to make an overall assessment of the effect of
the mass media on crime, it can only be that, at least accord-
ing to what has been demonstrated by study, the mass media
exert no wide-spread effects on the occurrence of crime in the
short run. The effect of the mass media on our society in the
long run is even more uncertain, and remains completely in
the realm of speculation. 5
I hasten to add, however, that this speculation is one of such intensity,
frequency, and perseverance that we have almost reached the point at
which the burden of proof has shifted to those who assert that mass
communications media have no detrimental effect on the incidence
of crime in America.
Since I am relatively pessimistic about our ability to improve
materially the existing legal machinery for the protection of criminal
defendants against virtually unfettered publicity, and since the press
cannot, under our constitutional provisions, be subjected to any ap-
preciably greater legal restraint than that existing, I am particularly
eager to experiment with informal restraints on publications media,
especially through the voluntary cooperation of the bench, the bar, the
police, and reporters and publishers. It is quite possible that local
standards or codes could be created by people who come into working
contact with each other from day to day, where national attempts on
a grand scale have failed. Such efforts have been successfully
attempted on an ad hoc basis in certain cases where a trial by news-
75 Orlow & Francis, supra note 65, at 250-51, which also contains an excellent
bibliography of sociological works dealing with the problem.
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paper was feared. One American author has discussed several cases
in which court orders were made for specific cases or in which the
trial judge and prosecutor merely spoke to newsmen, explaining the
dangers of unbridled publicity, thereby restraining the press and
preserving the dignity of the trial in relatively sensational cases:
This much is certain, that the bench and other law enforce-
ment authorities did control situations which presented diffi-
cult problems in the cases mentioned and did secure a general
co-operation of news distributing agencies and did secure
satisfactory results.7"
Along the same lines it has been suggested that the judiciary
assume the leadership in formulating standards. The Supreme Bench
of Baltimore issued a series of rules in 1939, rather rigidly circum-
scribing the type of publicity which could be given to criminal cases
from arrest until conviction. These rules were honored for ten years,
until the radio industry refused to go along any further. As a result,
in the contempt case of Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., v. State,77  the
rules were invalidated by the Supreme Court of Maryland. Yet the
Baltimore rules were an interesting and sincere attempt to cope with
the problem. Perhaps if they had resulted from cooperation between
lawyers and journalists and had been just slightly less rigid, they
might still be in effect.78 The desired spirit of cooperation cannot be
fostered by the kind of antagonistic debates between the legal and
journalistic professions which I have experienced in both Europe and
America.79 A more conciliatory attitude must be adopted so that
mutual education can take place.
76 Hallam, vupra note 73, at 473. For a discussion of cases in which cooperation
occurred see id. at 466-72.
77193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
78 An interesting experiment in furtherance of such a goal was the course in
Crime News Analysis and Reporting offered by the Northwestern University Schools
of Law and Journalism in March 1959. It was attended by seventy-three newsmen
from twenty-one states. According to the pamphlet announcing the course, it was
intended "to enrich newsmen's understanding of the crime problem" and "to improve
relationships between newsmen, law enforcement officers and the legal profession."
Among the matters included in the course were the problem of Canon 35, pretrial
news interviews with counsel, the privacy aspect of crime news reporting, the con-
tempt power and newsmen, and professional responsibility and self-restraint. This
short course has now become an annual program, and it deserves to be imitated
elsewhere.
79 The history of Canon 35, see note 30 supra, is an excellent example of how
lawyer-journalist cooperation should not be handled. Following the Hauptman trial,
a notorious case of trial by newspaper, the American Bar Association established a
special committee to cooperate with the press in working out acceptable standards
for the reporting of criminal trials. On September 27, 1937, portions of the com-
mittee's report were approved by the Bar Association, and the committee was continued
so that it might resolve certain differences-principally as to the propriety of using
cameras in the courtroom-which remained between the lawyers and the newsmen.
But three days later, without referring to the work of the special committee, the
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What has been said of industrywide self-restraint in connection
with publicity given to criminal proceedings ought to hold true for
information and entertainment published on crime as such. But
industrywide self-restraint in this sphere would require an amount of
maturity which, in the face of the laws of economics, our industries do
not possess. The responsibility rests on the citizen and his social
agencies to counteract whatever ill effect excessive crime publicity may
have, especially on the nation's young. They, of course, do enjoy the
law's special protection against possibly damaging crime publicity, but
such protection is neither certain nor complete. The American adult,
however, as much as he may resent crime publicity, refuses to permit
the law to reduce his reading level to that of a child. And after giving
occasional public voice to his anger against the existing state of affairs
he usually returns to the privacy of his home in order to watch the
next Western on television. But he does entertain little doubt that
the most profitable restraint would be a self-imposed one.
Association passed a recommendation of its Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances, adding Canon 35 to the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The press felt
that it had been betrayed, and, although the joint committee was not immediately
dissolved, the adoption of Canon 35 effectively barred further cooperation. Hallam,
supra note 73, at 462-66.
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